| Outbreak preparedness & control PPHSN Interim Guidance: March 19th 2003 Management of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have received reports of patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) from Canada, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Germany and the United Kingdom. The cause of these illnesses is unknown and is being investigated. Early manifestations in these patients have included influenza-like symptoms such as fever, myalgias, headache, sore throat, dry cough, shortness of breath, or difficulty breathing. In some cases these symptoms are followed by hypoxia, pneumonia, and occasionally acute respiratory distress requiring mechanical ventilation and death. Laboratory findings may include thrombocytopenia and leukopenia. Some close contacts, including healthcare workers, have developed similar illnesses. CDC, WHO and PPHSN have initiated surveillance for cases of SARS among travelers or their close contacts. WHO Case Definitions for hospital based surveillance Suspected case Clinicians should be alert for persons with onset of illness after February 1, 2003 with: Fever (>38° C)
AND
One or more signs or symptoms of respiratory illness, including:
AND One or more of the following:
Probable case
OR
Management of cases and contacts Management of suspect cases
if CXR is normal:
if CXR demonstrates uni- or bi-lateral infiltrates with or without interstitial infiltration
Management of probable cases
o throat and/or nasopharyngeal swabs and cold agglutinins o blood for culture and serology o urine o bronchoalveolar lavage o post mortem examination as appropriate It is advised that specimens are collected on alternate days. A number of reference laboratories are now able to receive and process samples. This should be co-ordinated through your national public health authority and PPHSN. Samples should be investigated in laboratories with proper containment facilities (BL3).
Comments: Broad-spectrum antibiotics have not appeared to be proven effective in halting SARS progression to date. Intravenous ribavirin and steroids may have stabilised the condition of one critically ill patient. Management of contacts of suspected and probable cases
o immediately report to doctor/physician/health authority o not report to work until advised by health authority o avoid public places until advised by health authority o minimize contact with family members and friends
Reporting of cases
Hospital Infection Control Guidance Care for patients with probable SARS WHO advises strict adherence with the barrier nursing of patients with SARS using precautions for airborne, droplet and contact transmission. Triage nurses should rapidly divert persons presenting to their health care facility with flu-like symptoms to a separate assessment area to minimise transmission to others in the waiting room. Suspect cases should wear surgical masks until SARS is excluded. Patients with probable SARS should be isolated and accommodated as follows in descending order of preference:
Note Turning off air conditioning and opening windows for good ventilation is recommended (if an independent air supply is unfeasible). Wherever possible, patients under investigation for SARS should be separated from those diagnosed with the syndrome. Disposable equipment should be used wherever possible in the treatment and care of patients with SARS. If devices are to be reused, they should be sterilised in accordance with manufacturers' instructions. Surfaces should be cleaned with broad spectrum (bactericidal, fungicidal, and virucidal) disinfectants of proven efficacy. Patient movement should be avoided as much as possible. Patients being moved should wear a surgical mask to minimise dispersal of droplets. NIOSH standard masks (N95), often used to protect against other highly transmissible respiratory infections such as tuberculosis, are preferred if tolerated by the patient. All visitors, staff, students and volunteers should wear a N95 mask on entering the room of a patient with confirmed or suspected SARS. Surgical masks are a less effective alternative to N95 masks. Handwashing is the most important hygiene measure in preventing the spread of infection. Gloves are not a substitute for handwashing. Hands should be washed before and after significant contact with any patient, after activities likely to cause contamination and after removing gloves. Alcohol-based skin disinfectants formulated for use without water may be used in certain limited circumstances. Health care workers are advised to wear gloves for all patient handling. Gloves should be changed between patients and after any contact with items likely to be contaminated with respiratory secretions (masks, oxygen tubing, nasal prongs, tissues). Gowns (waterproof aprons) and head covers should be worn during procedures and patient activities that are likely to generate splashes or sprays of respiratory secretions. HCWs must wear protective eyewear or face-shields during procedures where there is potential for splashing, splattering or spraying of blood or other body substances. HCWs are advised to wear masks whenever there is a possibility of splashing or splattering of blood or other body substances, or where airborne infection may occur. Particulate filter personal respiratory protection devices capable of filtering 0.3um particles (N95) should be worn at all times when attending patients with suspected or confirmed SARS. Standard precautions should be applied when handling any clinical wastes. All waste should be handled with care to avoid injuries from concealed sharps (which may not have been placed in sharps containers). Gloves and protective clothing should be worn when handling clinical waste bags and containers. Where possible, manual handling of waste should be avoided. Clinical waste must be placed in appropriate leak-resistant biohazard bags or containers labelled and disposed of safely.
Comment Please note that this situation is rapidly evolving and that the advice given will be constantly changing as more evidence about the causation and options for treatment becomes available. Compiled by: Dr Kevin Carroll MO/Epidemiologist WHO South Pacific on behalf of PPHSN
Reviewed by: Dr Tom Kiedrzynski Epidemiologist (Ag) Secretariat of the Pacific Community, PPHSN-CB Focal Point
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